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Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are one of the most common state-level 
policies meant to encourage low-carbon energy development. RPS require that utilities 
purchase electricity from certain qualifying electricity generators, usually with no 
reference to the cost of that electricity. Though RPS are often pushed as a means to clean 
up electricity generation, they also provide rents to the industries that are included in the 
RPS by protecting them from market competition with other generators. I explore the 
association between RPS and carbon emissions. I collect data from 1960 to 2017 on 
factors related to environmental quality, energy production, and state economic factors. 
The data’s availability varies, however, so the most expansive variables are from 1960 to 
2015 while many others fall into a shorter timeframe. The dataset relies heavily on the 
State Energy Data System (SEDS) that the Department of Energy’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) maintains, but also draws from a variety of other academic sources. 
Other variables, such as the dates of electricity market restructuring, I collect myself from 
primary sources. After accounting for existing linear trends in the data there appears to be 
no statistically significant relationship with RPS and carbon emissions.  
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Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are one of the most common state policies 
meant to encourage clean energy use. They require that utilities purchase electricity from 
certain qualifying electricity generators, usually with no reference to the cost of that 
electricity. Although RPS are meant to clean up electricity generation through using clean 
energy sources instead of fossil fuels, they may not do so effectively. Further, some 
energy companies may lobby state legislators to include their energy sources regardless 
of their actual environmental benefit. The actual relationship between enacting an RPS 
and a state’s emissions from energy production is unclear. I explore RPS associations 
with carbon emissions. I collect data from 1960 to 2017 on factors related to 
environmental quality, energy production, and state economic factors. The data 
availability varies, however, so the most expansive variables are from 1960 to 2017 while 
many others fall into a shorter timeframe. The dataset relies heavily on the State Energy 
Data System (SEDS) that the Department of Energy’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) maintains, but also draws from a variety of other academic sources. 
Other variables, such as the dates of electricity market restructuring, I collect myself from 
primary sources. After accounting for existing linear trends in the data there appears to be 
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Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are a common state-level policy that require 
electricity providers in a state to use certain sources of electricity as a percentage of their 
electricity-generating portfolio. The amount of required electricity from qualifying 
sources starts at a low level and then rises to a final ceiling. According to the Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), 29 states and Washington DC 
have adopted binding RPS. Several other states, such as Utah and Kansas, have voluntary 
standards. Figure 1 from DSIRE shows a map of state RPS as of February of 2017.  
Figure 1. State RPS Map from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency.1 
 






RPS Goals and History 
RPS primarily were enacted to promote the use of low-carbon, or clean, energy 
sources. As one of many policies adopted to climate change, they are intended to reduce 
carbon emissions and prevent environmental pollution. Clean energy advocates claim that 
RPS will boost economic growth and create jobs, and some enacting legislation includes 
this as a goal of the policy, but economic goals are secondary goals to the environmental 
purposes of an RPS. 
State requirements vary under RPS, as DSIRE’s map makes clear. For example, 
New Hampshire’s RPS requires that 25.2 percent of its electricity be generated from 
qualifying energy sources by 2025.2 Texas, instead of requiring a percentage of the 
energy mix, requires that 10,000 megawatts (MWs) of electricity be produced from 
renewables by 2025.3  
The timing of RPS enactments also varies widely. Iowa enacted the first RPS in 
1983. Other states began adopting renewable portfolio standards in the following years. 
Table 1 displays the enactment dates updated from previous studies of RPS (Upton & 
Snyder 2017; Lyon, 2015). Kansas and West Virginia both repealed their RPS in early 
2015. Kansas in May and West Virginia in February. Extending Upton & Snyder (2017), 
my timeline also includes Vermont’s 2015 enactment of an RPS. 
Table 1 




Year RPS Enacted 
                                                             
2 http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/2523 
3 http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/182 
4 Blanks indicate that no RPS has been enacted in that state. These dates are updated from Upton and 




Alaska No RPS 
Alabama No RPS 






Florida No RPS 
Georgia No RPS 
Hawaii 2004 
Iowa 1983 
Idaho No RPS 
Illinois No RPS 
Indiana No RPS 
Kansas 2009 (repealed 2015) 
Kentucky No RPS 










Mississippi No RPS 
Montana 2005 
North Carolina 2007 
North Dakota No RPS 
Nebraska No RPS 
New Hampshire 2007 
New Jersey 2001 
New Mexico 2002 
Nevada 1997 
New York 2004 
Ohio 2008 
Oklahoma No RPS 
Oregon 2007 
Pennsylvania 2004 
Rhode Island 2004 
South Carolina No RPS 
South Dakota No RPS 
Tennessee No RPS 
Texas 1999 
Utah No RPS 







West Virginia 2009 (repealed 2015) 
Wyoming No RPS 
 
Most RPS enactments occur through normal political means. State legislatures 
enact them after a period of discussion and debate. Arizona, however, originally created a 
solar only standard through the Arizona Corporation Commission, which is the state’s 
public utility commission. Eventually the state expanded the RPS to include more than 
solar. When Iowa enacted its RPS, long legal disputes ensued, but those eventually were 
resolved and RPS went into effect.  
There is extensive public debate in states with RPS revolving the appropriate 
levels to set. California and some other states, for example, raise their RPS goals 
occasionally from the initial levels set under the first bill. States without RPS often 
consider enacting them and two states, West Virginia and Kansas, have repealed their 
RPS in response to worries about RPS driving increases in electricity rates and concerns 
about economic costs. 
The environmental goal of lowering carbon emissions is the primary aim of RPS. 






Figure 2. Carbon Emissions in RPS States (calculated from EIA Data) 
Carbon emissions have been stable overall from 1990 to 2015 in RPS states. As Figure 3 






























































CO2 (Million Metric Tons) for RPS States
Arizona California Colorado Connecticut
Delaware District of Columbia Hawaii Iowa
Kansas Maine Maryland Massachusetts
Michigan Minnesota Missouri Montana
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico
New York North Carolina Ohio Oregon
Pennsylvania Rhode Island Texas Vermont





Figure 3. Carbon Emissions in Non-RPS States (calculated from EIA Data) 
The average difference in CO2 emissions between RPS states and non-RPS states is 
small. Figure 4 shows that the two groups of states are at relatively similar levels and 





























































CO2 (Million Metric Tons) for Non-RPS States
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Average Emissions for RPS and Non-RPS States (1990-2015)




Figure 4: Average CO2 Emissions for RPS and Non-RPS States (calculated from EIA 
Data) 
 
 Figures 2, 3, and 4 do not reveal an obvious relationship between an RPS and 
lower carbon emissions. This makes a more rigorous statistical analysis an interesting 
research question. 
Overview of Methods, Findings, and Implications 
To investigate the relationship between RPS and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
I estimate a simple difference-in-differences (DD) model that controls for state fixed 
effects and time fixed effects. Initial modeling reveals a statistically significant reduction 
in CO2 of about five percent. This relationship is robust to several controls but fades out 
when a control for total energy consumption is added to the model. It appears an RPS 
decreases carbon emissions by lowering overall consumption of energy. This is in line 
with the findings of previous research that posits that an RPS may raise electricity prices 
and thus push down electricity consumption (Upton & Snyder 2017).  
The model cannot attribute those emissions declines to the RPS, however, 
because of the pre-existing trends. Instead, what appears to be happening is that RPS 
states likely enact many environmental policies that target emissions. The cumulative 
effect of those regulations does appear to lower emissions. Accurately attributing the 
emissions reduction to any single policy is difficult to justify. States with an RPS, for 
example, likely have a powerful environmental lobbying sector responsible for originally 
passing the RPS. This lobby likely is interested in other environmental protections and so 
there is a fundamental difference between RPS states and non-RPS states that a DD 




work on RPS employing the DD method as well. 
The state fixed effects and the time fixed effects control for time invariant factors 
such as the qualities of renewable energy resources in a state or the culture of a state. Yet 
the fixed effects for states and years may not properly account for the existing trends in 
states before the enactment of an RPS. Although a DD model mimics an experimental 
design by creating treated and untreated groups for comparison, the enactment of RPS is 
unlikely to be random and so does not meet all of the standards for interpreting the 
research design as a true natural experiment. As I ultimately show, there are preexisting 
trends in states that enact RPS that do not exist in non-RPS states. So RPS states may not 
be on a parallel trend, sometimes called a parallel path, with non-RPS states, thereby 
rendering any DD model’s findings as spurious and unreliable. 
After accounting for the pre-existing policy state-specific policy heterogeneity by 
introducing trend variables, the model predicts no statistically significant relationship 
between RPS and lower emissions of CO2. These results extend past findings (Upton & 
Snyder 2017), which did not account for the state trends that existed before the RPS was 
enacted. These state trends, however vary by state and if not accounted for, lead to 
spurious results in statistical models.  
The inclusion of linear trends is a unique contribution to the study of RPS and 
emissions as well as possibly a unique contribution to the growing number of studies 










There are several common strands in the previous academic literature on RPS. 
Individual studies rarely silo themselves neatly into a single branch. Three areas in 
particular stand out as involving most of the academic work on RPS. First, one of the 
largest branches of research on RPS examines the factors contributing to the enactment of 
an RPS. Broadly, it finds that political factors such as ideology, party affiliation, and 
voter preferences are important predictors of RPS enactment in addition to renewable 
resource potential in the state. Second, as a primarily environmental policy, researchers 
regularly examine the environmental benefits of RPS such as projected carbon abatement 
and increased renewable energy capacity built. Finally, perhaps one of the most 
controversial areas of research in political circles is the effect RPS have on electricity 
prices. Most research here finds that RPS increase electricity prices (Tra 2016; Upton & 
Snyder 2017).  
I fit into all three of these veins of research. The dataset I ultimately develop will 
be used in projects that directly contribute to each of these strands in future work. For 
example, other studies of RPS enactment have not accounted for whether or not a state 
restructured its electricity market. There are important questions with this question alone 
for all three research areas. Restructuring may have a differential influence on whether an 
RPS is enacted, how well it achieves its environmental goals, and how costly the policy 
is. For example, do more competitive electricity markets lower or enhance the 
environmental benefits created by an RPS? Or similarly for the economic costs area, do 
restructured markets make RPS more or less economically costly? And finally, are states 
that enact an RPS also more likely to pursue restructuring? Perhaps because of an 
underlying desire to promote innovative energy policies? Each of these questions merit 





Why do States Enact RPS? 
The enactment of an RPS is meant to serve multiple goals. As such, previous 
literature on why states adopt RPS examines the influence of: environmental interest 
groups, fossil fuel interest groups, political ideology, neighboring states’ policies, and 
renewable energy resource quality. 
Research on RPS adoption has long shown the importance of political factors 
such as the size and relative powers of competing interest groups (Chupp 2011; Lyon & 
Yin 2010; Matisoff 2008; Fowler 2013). Fowler (2013) concludes that the political 
factors like partisanship and political culture are most important in RPS adoption.  
Lyon and Yin (2010) provide an exhaustive test of multiple hypotheses and find a 
variety of interesting results. For example, Lyon and Yin hypothesize that states with 
lower air quality may be more likely to enact RPS so that they can improve their state’s 
air quality, but they ultimately reject this hypothesis even when examining the adoption 
of in-state requirements. They find that having a greater number of Democrats in the state 
legislature increases the likelihood that states will adopt an RPS, but also that the 
governor’s party is inconsequential. Two primary results of interest that fit into the 
interest-group theory of regulation from Olson (1960) are that Lyon and Yin find that the 
presence of well-organized renewable energy interest groups is associated with a 19 times 
increase in the likelihood of a state adopting an RPS. Similarly, a heavy reliance on 
natural gas decreases the likelihood that a state will adopt an RPS. 
Huang, Alavalapati, Carter, and Langholtz (2007) investigate whether the 
adoption of an RPS by states is random. They find that education levels and the political 




similar question on whether or not neighboring states’ policies push states to adopt an 
RPS and finds that citizen demands for an RPS are better explanations than is diffusion 
from one state to another. Chandler (2009) by contrast, concludes that neighbor diffusion 
variables are important. Chandler’s findings, however, use a broader definition of RPS 
that includes energy efficiency standards as well as the RPS that Matisoff investigates. 
That may still pick up the influence of neighboring states since it is not necessarily true 
that the diffusion must be for exactly the same policy. More recent work by Carley 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller (2017) shows geographical peers are most important in 
diffusion, but that ideological peers are most important in terms of reinventing policies. 
Renewable energy resources are another common predictor of whether or not a 
state adopts an RPS. Lyon and Yin (2010) find that biomass resources are not related to 
adoption, but that wind and solar resources are. This finding has been verified in other 
works as well (Upton & Snyder 2015). 
Carley and Miller (2012) investigate why states may adopt a more or less 
stringent RPS. They find that there is stratification between the contributing factors by 
stringency factors. More stringent standards are driven by different factors than are less 
stringent factors. State-level citizen ideology is a significant predictor for voluntary and 
weaker RPS. Stronger policy designs are more affected by the government level ideology 
than citizen ideology. 
What Environmental Effects do RPS Have? 
 RPS incentivize the use of renewable energy and deter the use of fossil fuels. 
Ultimately, this is meant to lower carbon emissions and the emissions of other pollutants 
(Wiser et al. 2017). Using the Regional Energy Development System to project several 




create between $97 billion and $161 billion worth of benefits, most of which come from 
reduced pollution and the corresponding health effects (Wiser et al. 2017). These benefit 
estimates follow from the more conservative assumptions based on existing RPS policies 
and far outstrip their cost estimates. Other work using similar modeling techniques like 
the National Energy Modeling System have made similar projections (Kydes 2007). 
 One worry about these estimates, however, is that RPS may not actually 
contribute to expanded renewable energy generation capacity. A contentious point in the 
literature concerns the effect RPS have on the development of additional renewable 
energy capacity. Some early work found increasing renewable energy capacity in the 
states that enacted RPS (Kydes 2007; Carley 2009; Yin & Powers 2010; Eastin 2014). 
Yin and Powers (2010) develops a measure of RPS stringency for its analysis and finds 
that RPS are associated with higher levels of in-state renewable energy development but 
note that it is sensitive to when renewable energy credits (RECs) trading is allowed. 
RECs are the compliance mechanism for states with RPS. Electricity generators earn 
RECs by generating electricity from the qualifying sources in the RPS and can either 
retire them against their own obligation to produce renewable energy or sell them. Some 
states allow REC trading across state borders while others do not.  
Some studies of RPS enactment and renewable energy deployment show mixed 
results. Even Carley (2009), though she finds that an RPS is associated with increased 
capacity, does not find evidence of increased electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources.  Kniefel and Shrimali (2011) find that an RPS increases deployment of 
geothermal and solar while decreasing the use of other renewable sources like wind and 
biomass. Maguire (2016) finds that the enactment of an RPS seems to be unrelated to the 




synthetic control model and find strong evidence of the effect of RPS on renewable 
energy deployment only in Texas. Texas is unique. It met its RPS obligation several years 
ahead of schedule and even though the RPS is legally binding, it may not have been an 
economically binding constraint on electricity providers in the state. Maguire and 
Munasib contend that a synthetic control method (SCM) is a more appropriate method 
than previous studies employed because state RPS vary widely. Another paper employed 
a difference-in-differences (DD) method and a SCM for comparison and found no 
evidence of increased renewable energy capacity associated with the enactment of an 
RPS (Upton and Snyder 2017). Although they are not specific to the effect of an RPS, 
analyses of incentive programs for specific energy sources such as wind and solar 
consistently find that they increase deployment of the supported energy source even 
though the effect of the RPS is not always statistically significant (Hitaj 2012; Lasco & 
Chernyakhovskiy, 2016). 
If RPS are not associated with increased renewable energy development in states 
that enact them, there is good reason to doubt they will achieve their environmental goals. 
Yet only a few estimates of the relationship between emissions and RPS exist. Upton and 
Snyder (2017) do characterize their evidence of an emissions reduction as weak and 
attribute it to the increase in prices associated with an RPS and the resulting lower total 
demand and not to increased reliance on renewable energy. Eastin (2014) finds evidence 
of cleaner air at the 0.05 level and lower carbon emissions, but only at the 0.1 level. 
Eastin also caveats that these findings may not be only because of the RPS, but rather the 
full suite of policy options that states, municipalities, and federal groups offer to the 
renewable energy industry. In an unpublished working paper, Sekar and Sohngen (2014) 




statistically significant decrease. They estimate the adoption of an RPS reduced total 
carbon emissions in the United States by about four percent in 2010. They do not 
attribute this decline to increasing renewable energy generation, but instead to the 
increase in prices associated with RPS adoption that results in lower electricity 
consumption. 
Even if RPS do lower carbon emissions, some research suggests it is not a cost-
effective means to reach lower emissions. Modeling comparing a cap-and-trade policy to 
RPS shows that an RPS is more expensive, but less expensive than a renewable energy 
production tax credit (Palmer & Burtraw 2005).  
What Economic Costs do RPS Have? 
Early advocates and analyses of the likely effect of RPS argued that they would 
provide environmental benefits in addition to lowering electricity prices. Although 
speaking of an analysis of a federal RPS, Sovacool and Cooper (2007) summarize work 
by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Network for New Energy Choices, the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
which all concluded that an RPS would lower electricity prices through economies of 
scale. Advocates of renewable energy contest almost any link between RPS and higher 
electricity prices (American Wind Energy Association 2013; Shahan 2014). 
 The academic literature is generally clear that adopting an RPS is associated with 
higher electricity prices (Palmer and Burtraw 2005; Fischer 2009; Tra 2015; Upton and 
Snyder 2015; Wang 2016; Upton and Snyder 2017). These results hold across a variety of 
empirical methods and when including a variety of controls. Maguire and Munasib 
(2018) appear to be unique in finding no price increase associated with the enactment of 





Fischer (2009) models the conditions required for an RPS to lower electricity 
prices. She finds that an RPS can lower electricity prices only when an RPS is set 
between three and 7.5 percent. These are far smaller levels than those that states 
commonly set as their ultimate standards. The price declines originally because decreased 
demand for natural gas lowers electricity prices. Then prices rise as the implicit tax on 
energy production from non-qualifying sources overwhelms the decline in natural gas 
prices. 
 In addition to RPS’s association with electricity prices, researchers also often 
investigate the effect of RPS on employment. Advocates of RPS generally claim that the 
policy can both decrease carbon emissions and create jobs (Rabe 2007). Empirical 
investigations of this claim, however, have found little relationship. In a working paper, 
Boampong, Knapp, and Phillips (2016) find no evidence of a change in total 
employment. Bowen (2013) however, finds no total job growth but does observe an 
increase in green businesses associated with RPS adoption. 
 Importantly, however, some research contests the ability of RPS to serve both 
economic and environmental goals simultaneously. A working paper by Bento, Garg, and 
Kaffine (2017) finds that increasing RPS likely results in either large emissions savings 
or large job growth in the renewable energy industry, but not both. They decompose the 
effect of an RPS increase into three parts: a substitution effect, an output-tax, and an 
output effect. The substitution effect is movement of capital from fossil fuel resources 
and into renewable energy investment because of the pull of the subsidy. This effect can 
create resource growth in the renewable energy industry. The output-tax occurs for a 




and is used in a composite sector instead. Together, the substitution and output-tax effect, 
according to the researchers, are the two means for RPS compliance. That is, a standard 
can be met by either increasing renewable energy generation or by lowering fossil fuel 
energy production. The third and final effect the researchers discuss is the output effect, 
which is caused by changes in prices because of the change in the RPS. As the price of 
electricity rises, the composite good becomes relatively cheaper and consumers naturally 
purchase less electricity and more of the composite.   
My Contribution to the Literature  
 The existing literature on RPS and carbon emissions so far has assumed that the 
DD models employed meet the background assumptions of parallel trends. Chapter 5 
provides evidence that this assumption may not hold. There appears to be a difference 













I collect the majority of data employed in the empirical testing from the State 
Energy Database System (SEDS), which is run by the United States Department of 
Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA).5 Broadly, SEDS includes the 
production and use of energy sources from 1960 to 2015 and the prices of energy 
resources from 1970 to 2015. The EIA also provides data on emissions from 1990 to 
2015 in a separate dataset.6 The separate dataset calculates emissions based on the SEDS 
data by multiplying certain fuel sources by “carbon coefficients” that represent how much 
carbon is generated from using each fuel source. One note about this data, however, is 
that it excludes carbon emissions from biomass by assuming that biomass emissions will 
be a lifecycle net zero since new biomass will be planted to replace the burned biomass. 
Energy from biomass is only a small portion of total energy consumption and so is 
unlikely to affect the results. 
For robustness checks I also collected data provided by the Institute for Public 
Policy and Social Research (IPPSR) at Michigan State University and the University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) on political and economic factors that 
may also influence RPS emissions.7 The IPPSR (2017) data is from a project to combine 
datasets involving state policy factors for use by other researchers and ultimately foster 
further research. Its data’s timeline varies widely based on the original study that it is 
pulled from, but the variables I use generally run from 1980 to 2015.  
The UKCPR’s (2017) data is a state-level dataset maintained for use in policy 
                                                             
5 U.S. Energy Information Administration. State Energy Data System (SEDS): 1960-2015. June 30, 2017. 
Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.php?sid=US 
6 U.S. Energy Information Administration. State Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data. Energy Information 
Administration. January 22, 2018. https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/ / 
7 Jordan, Marty P. and Matt Grossmann. 2016. The Correlates of State Policy Project v1.14. East Lansing, 
MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR).; University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research. 2017. “UKCPR National Welfare Data, 1980-2016.” Gatton College of Business and Economics, 




analysis and academic work, particularly as it relates to questions of poverty. It generally 
runs from 1980 to 2015. My preferred model’s results generally are robust to the 
inclusion of these variables and s 
ince they are not the central factor in my research question, I do not include them in the 
baseline model. 
I also constructed a binary variable for whether or not a state’s electricity market 
is a restructured or a vertically integrated market. A vertically integrated electricity 
market is a state-granted natural monopoly on electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution. Generation is the creation of electricity that is then transmitted along high 
voltage power lines and eventually distributed along lower voltage lines for use by 
electricity consumers. A restructured electricity market, by contrast, breaks up the 
monopoly and allows competition in the generation market (Lien 2008).8 
To be clear, restructuring electricity markets is too diverse a policy change to be 
represented accurately by a binary variable. Although many states restructured their 
electricity markets, the extent and type of restructuring does not collapse to a binary 
factor and retain much of its meaning. Not only do states begin restructuring processes 
and then halt them, as in the cases of states like California, Montana, and New Mexico, 
but they restructure in fundamentally different ways. The adoption and acceptance of 
restructuring by electricity customers varies widely. Texas follows a retail choice model 
that creates a market for electricity similar to markets for any other good or service that 
covers most of the state. Consumers within the competitive electricity markets in Texas 
may enter their zip code on powertochoose.org and browse the plans, sometimes the 
                                                             
8 Lien, Jeff. “Electricity Restructuring: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and What is Next.” Economic 





hundreds of plans. Another confounding factor is that Texas’s model is facilitated by the 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which lies entirely within Texas and 
therefore is state-controlled. State-control grants ERCOT much more latitude than other 
electricity markets receive. By contrast, Virginia allows only a small portion of its 
electricity consumers to participate in the restructured market. 
The EIA maintained a map of restructured electricity markets but discontinued the 
updates in 2003 (EIA 2003).9 Other sources do not provide clear and consistent 
definitions of restructured in their own data. Electricchoice.com, for example, maintains a 
small database of the current restructuring trends at the state-level and counts Virginia as 
a restructured state.10 The implications of restructuring electricity markets on emissions 
and electricity prices deserves its own investigation in future projects. 
None of these datasets timelines match perfectly with each other. Since I am 
primarily interested in the relationship of RPS with CO2 emissions I limit the data used 
in my empirical modeling to only the 26 years contained in the emissions data, 1990 to 
2015. This is the timeline I have complete data for each of my variables. Ultimately, the 
dataset I create can serve as a basis for future projects on RPS and related environmental 
or energy questions. 
                                                             
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity.” 
February 2003. 






EMPIRICAL METHODS: SIMPLE DD MODEL 
I estimate two primary difference-in-differences (DD) models. First, a simple DD 
model with state and year fixed effects to examine the association of an RPS with 
emissions. The second more complicated model, explained in chapter 5, includes the first 
model, but importantly also includes controls for pre-existing trends that allows for state 
heterogeneity in trends before an RPS is ever enacted. I find some evidence that quadratic 
and cubic trends may be necessary, but the linear trend is likely justified. I present the 
results from those models as well in the next chapter. This second model’s insight into 
how state-specific trends affect the results of DD models is a unique contribution to the 
study of RPS.   
A DD model will show the total effect of the policy and later controls can be 
included in order to investigate the channels that an RPS may work through. In the case 
of an RPS, controls can be added to the model to reveal if an RPS is working as it is 
intended. That is, does an RPS work by increasing investment in renewable energy 
technologies, or if there are other channels an RPS is associated with emissions through.  
Even though an RPS is meant to reduce carbons by encouraging the use of lower 
carbon sources of energy, it may reduce carbon in other ways. For example, an RPS 
could raise electricity prices and thereby lower the amount of electricity demanded by 
consumers. This lower electricity demand would in turn lower emissions from utilities. 
Another mechanism that is likely lowering carbon emissions is the switch from coal to 
natural gas. Natural gas is less carbon intensive than coal, meaning it produces greater 
amounts of electricity for each unit of carbon emissions. Given that the fracking boom 




environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) may also play a factor in any statistical estimate of 
reduced emissions associated with an RPS. The EKC argues that the demand for 
environmental quality is not a linear function. Poor people are less concerned with their 
environmental quality and the environment’s cleanliness. Economic development thus 
originally contributes to declining environmental quality as individuals create pollutants. 
At some level of wealth, however, an inversion point is reached, and the richer 
individuals begin demanding cleaner environments. As individuals become wealthier 
they may invest in environmental policies, including the RPS but not limited to it, that 
improve environmental quality. 
Each of these factors relates to the channels through which an RPS may improve 
environmental health and prevent climate change. They all complicate the theoretical 
story of how an RPS works (inducing additional use of clean energy sources) because 
they may be causing other actions that lower carbon emissions. By adding in control 
variables, however, the original and simple model can be expanded to investigate a more 
nuanced relationship between an RPS and carbon emissions. 
Simple DD Model and Assumptions 
I use a simple difference-in-differences (DD) model that controls for state fixed 
effects and time fixed effects to investigate the relationship between RPS and carbon 
dioxide (CO2). The state fixed effects and the time fixed effects control for time invariant 
factors such as the quality of renewable energy resources in a state or the culture of a 
state. 
DD models mimic an experimental design by creating treated and untreated 
groups for comparison. Importantly, DD models assume that the treated and untreated 




treated group had gone untreated, then it would have behaved the same as the untreated 
group. That is, states cannot be moving in opposite directions prior to the treatment or 
trending at different rates prior to the treatment. If states are not on parallel trends, then 
the DD will incorrectly estimate the coefficient on the DD variable. It can overestimate or 
underestimate the coefficient depending on the trend. The parallel trends assumption 
requires that the factors affecting the control and the treatment groups were the same 
before the treatment, and only after the treatment is applied do the states change. As I go 
on to show in chapter 5, the fundamental problem with this simple DD model is that it 
cannot examine a true “counterfactual” because the parallel trends assumption is violated. 
Each model of emissions and RPS can be understood using the following 
equation:  
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠',) = 	𝑅𝑃𝑆',) + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝐸' + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸) + 𝜈',) + 𝜀',).							(1)  
The left-hand side simply is the emissions of CO2 in metric tons. The first independent 
variable on the right-hand side is the DD estimator, a binary variable indicating whether 
or not an RPS exists in that state in that year. The next two variables are state and year 
fixed effects that account for time-invariant unobserved variables. The controls are 
represented by 𝑣',). Controls vary in the models I present but include natural gas use and 
total energy use. The final variable is simply the unobserved factors. 
I estimate three variants of equation one to examine the relationship between 
carbon emissions and RPS. The first only includes the RPS and fixed effects for states 
and years. This is the baseline model and in then include controls in the second and third 
models. Splitting the models like this serves as a robustness check for the first model’s 
results. It allows researchers to examine the channels that an RPS, or other policy 




RPS affects emissions. For example, in the second model I control for the total 
consumption of natural gas because carbon emissions are falling in part because of the 
switch from coal to natural gas. In particular, previous research shows that as the amount 
of renewable energy generation grows in an area, more natural gas is consumed because 
natural gas plants are less expensive backups for variable renewable energy sources 
(Verdolini et. al, 2016).  
In the case of RPS and CO2 emissions, I want to estimate the decrease in CO2 
associated with an increase in the use of the qualifying energy sources and not because of 
greater reliance on natural gas. So, the second model includes the log of total natural gas 
consumption for each state. Similarly, in the third model I also control for total energy 
consumption in the third variation of the CO2 model. The same natural gas theory holds 
for total energy consumption. I am primarily interested in the decrease in emissions from 
the increased use of renewable energy technologies and not because energy consumption 
decreases in response to an RPS. Including total energy consumption also serves as a 
robustness check for the RPS variable. I predict that as total energy consumption 
increases, carbon emissions will similarly increase.11 
Table 2 displays results from three variations of the model estimating the 
                                                             
11 In addition to these three models, I also investigated other theories on CO2 emissions from the literature, 
but they do not affect the model’s primary results and are not presented. First, per capita income in 2016 
dollars to account for any confounding effects that wealth may have. Income should be positively related to 
carbon emissions as wealthier people will likely consume more energy. I also included a squared term for 
the per capita income variable. This can be understood as a control for the Environmental Kuznets Curve as 
well. The U.S. in 1990, when the emissions data begins, was likely already on the downward sloping 
portion of the curve so it is unlikely this a major factor in emissions. Second, I controlled for whether or not 
the Governor of the state is a Democrat as a high-level proxy for how many other environmental programs 
the state has enacted and how environmentally conscious the state’s citizens residents are. Having a 
Democratic governor is likely negatively related to emissions. None of these inclusions, however, 
meaningfully changed the direction or size of the coefficient of interest and likely introduce some amount 
of endogeneity and so are excluded. The party affiliation variable is also likely changing too slowly to have 




relationship between RPS and carbon emissions.12 
Table 2  
CO2 and RPS Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Simple DD DD w/ Controls 1 DD w/ Controls 2 DD w/ Controls 3 
     
RPS -0.0494** -0.0539*** -0.0144 -0.0178 
 (0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0148) (0.0143) 
Log(Natural Gas 
Consumption) 
 0.0721*  0.0335*** 
  (0.0397)  (0.0130) 
Log(Total Energy 
Consumption) 
  0.659*** 0.634*** 
   (0.0731) (0.0739) 
Constant 3.569*** 2.661*** -5.876*** -5.944*** 
 (0.0140) (0.503) (1.048) (1.089) 
     
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Number of States 50 50 50 50 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F Stat (p-value)  3.30 (0.0692) 81.26 (0.000) 76.43 (0.000) 
Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
Models 1 and 2 show a statistically significant decrease in carbon emissions of 
                                                             
12 Lags and leads of three years had no meaningful influence on these results and were not statistically 
significant. Including the state’s governor’s party, logged population, and real per capita income (in 2016 




about five percent. The significance, however, is sensitive to the inclusion of total energy 
demand in model 3. This suggests that an RPS may work through decreasing total energy 
demand. Model 4 simply includes both controls to demonstrate robustness. Controlling 
for both total energy consumption and natural gas consumption means that an increase or 
decrease in natural gas now cannot change the total amount of energy consumed in a state 
in that year. Any increase in natural gas must now result in a decrease in the use of other 
energy sources. How this affects carbon emissions will depend on the energy generation 











Introducing Trends to the Simple DD Model 
In chapter 5, I demonstrate the influence of the linear trend on the variable and 
further discuss the parallel trends assumption and how it is violated. The data employed 
in the earlier DD model does not satisfy the technical assumption of “parallel paths” for 
DD models. The assumption’s violation is likely responsible for the statistical 
significance of the estimated relationship between RPS enactment and CO2 emissions 
since including controls for the trend eliminates the significance. In this chapter I show 
how the parallel paths assumption is not met and that there are likely state linear trends 
and possibly higher order trends that must be accounted for to make the predictions from 
the DD model accurate. Even after accounting for these trends, skepticism is justified.  
The Parallel Trends Assumption is Likely Violated 
Parallel trends, or sometimes called common trends or parallel paths, is a bedrock 
assumption of DD models that is often simply taken as given. It holds that before the 
treatment, both the untreated and treated groups were following parallel paths. The 
parallel paths assumption guarantees that the differences tested before and after treatment 
are due to the treatment and not to underlying trends. Without it, there is no guarantee 
that the results are accurate, reliable, or unbiased.  
The trends that the parallel paths assumption prohibits are separate trends than 
simple time trends that the time fixed effects variables control for. Instead, they represent 
the key to DD’s identification strategy. Regressions using differences-in-differences 
assumes that without the treatment the treated group and the untreated group would 
continue along a common trend. It then exploits a treatment of a subset of the group to 
formally consider the counter-factual of what would have happened without the 




then the treatment variable will not be correctly estimated. The effect may be 
overestimated or underestimated depending on the trend. For example, Figure 5 
graphically shows the theory of a DD model. 
  
Figure 5. Graphical Representation of the DD Model13 
 Even though the two groups shown in Figure 2 are not on the exact same path, the 
distance between them is constant until the treatment is applied. This allows researchers 
to exploit the difference between the treated and untreated groups to consider what could 
have happened without the treatment and thus establish the treatment’s effect.  
The use of parallel is important because the assumption does not require that the 
two groups be on the same path, but rather simply that the paths head in generally the 
same direction. If RPS states have consistently higher emissions, for example, but it is by 
approximately constant levels before the RPS was enacted, this would not violate the 
                                                             





parallel paths requirement.  
A violation of the parallel paths assumption is when the treated and untreated 
groups are not simply at different levels of the variable of interest, but rather when they 
are traveling in different directions. Parallel lines never cross, diverge, or converge. If the 
data before RPS enactment shows divergence, for example, then this assumption is likely 
violated and the results of any DD analysis using the data will be spurious. Figure 6 does 
not clearly demonstrate that divergence, however. Note that the data is limited to 1990-
1996 because the first RPS enactments in my data begin to appear in 1997 and 1999 
(although Iowa enacted in 1983). 
 
 
Figure 6. CO2 Emissions Before the Majority of RPS Enactments (1990-1996) 








Figure 7. Average Logged CO2 Emissions by Year (1990-2015) 
As depicted, although the CO2 emissions in 1990 are relatively close, the gap 
between RPS and non-RPS states grows throughout time. It is clear that the emissions of 
RPS states, shown in blue, are on a diverging path from the states without an RPS, shown 
in red. It is not clear from these graphs, however, if the parallel trends assumption is 
violated. From 1990 to 1996 there appears to be little to no divergence before the 
treatment, RPS enactment, is applied to the states. Figures 3 and 4 show that RPS states 
have lower emissions before they even enact an RPS. This is not a problem for the 




does suggest that the parallel trends assumption should be investigated statistically. The 
gap could indicate that there is a trend that distinguishes RPS and non-RPS states that 
should be accounted for. 
Demonstrating the Trend 
 Demonstrating the trend is a difficult endeavor, but the simplest way is to create a 
linear variable to feed into the regression, then create a policy variable, and finally to 
interact the two and consider if the trend is merely linear or quadratic or an even higher 
order relationship. The most straightforward test is then an F test to compare a restricted 
model to an unrestricted model. The results indicate that at least a linear trend is needed. 
These tests will estimate whether states that enacted a policy were trending differently 
than states that did not enact a policy. 
 Equation one can be modified to represent these tests:  
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠',) = 	𝑅𝑃𝑆',) + 𝜃' + 𝛿) + 𝜏'𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + 𝜀',).							(2) 
Additional trends, quadratic and cubic, can be included in the regression model. Table 3 
includes the trend, the policy variable, and the interaction term between the two. I also 
restrict the regression so that when a state drops out once it enacts an RPS. The negative 
and significant interaction terms indicate there is at least a linear trend related to states 
enacting an RPS and verifies the divergence prior to treatment that renders the simple DD 
model’s findings spurious. If the RPS coefficient in the DD model was negative, but the 
interaction was positive, then that would provide evidence that the original results were 
correct. Because it would work against the argument that RPS states are on a divergent 
path from non-RPS states where their emissions decline at a faster rate because of a 
preexisting trend. It would still be difficult to know the actual effect of an RPS, but it 




 To check the existence of the trend, I restrict the regression to data before 1997. 
This is because only Iowa, since it enacted in 1983, has an RPS in this timeframe. This 
tests the trends pre-treatment. Table 3 contains these results. It shows only a significant 
linear trend. Note that this regression only contains 350 observations, seven years with 50 
states in each year. This indicates that states that enact an RPS are on different trends 
before an RPS is enacted that must be accounted for to accurately employ a DD model. 
Table 3 
Check for Trends (1990 through 1996 Test)14 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Policy*Trend Policy*Trend Quadratic Policy*Trend Cubic 
    
Policy 0.0799***  0.0362 
 (0.0143)  (0.0361) 
    
Linear Trend 0.0222*** 0.00766  
 (0.00208) (0.00665)  
    
Policy * Linear Trend -0.00863** 0.00270 0.0331 
 (0.00356) (0.0103) (0.0305) 
    
Quadratic Trend  0.00181** 0.00466*** 
  (0.000873) (0.000886) 
    
Policy * Quadratic 
Trend 
 -0.00142 -0.0103 
  (0.00119) (0.00767) 
    
Cubic Trend   -0.000281** 
   (0.000129) 
    
Policy * Cubic Trend   0.000741 
                                                             





   (0.000596) 
    
Constant 3.541*** 3.558*** 3.566*** 
 (0.00890) (0.0101) (0.00661) 
    
Observations 350 350 350 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic Trend No Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend No No Yes 
F Stat (p-value) 5.87 (0.0191) 3.72 (0.0315) 3.54 (0.0211) 
Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
 
 The results in Table 3 suggest that the interaction between the policy variable and 
the linear trend is significant. This verifies the existence of the trend that could not earlier 
be verified visually from the data. The F tests restrict each interaction term to zero and 
provide statistical evidence that the trends should be included. 
 As a robustness check for the existence of a linear trend I run the same regression 
as above, but as an unbalanced panel. States are in the regression until they enact an RPS. 
Again, the linear trend and policy variable interaction term are significant and suggest a 
linear trend. The quadratic and cubic trends, however, are not. The inclusion of the 
interaction term is further verified by an F test. 
Table 4 
Robustness Check Using an Unbalanced Panel Test for Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Policy*Trend Policy*Trend Quadratic Policy*Trend Cubic 
    




 (0.0146) (0.0197) (0.0231) 
    
Linear Trend 0.00572*** 0.0319*** 0.0261*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00333) (0.00413) 
    
Policy * Linear Trend -0.00649*** -0.00483 -0.0147* 
 (0.00187) (0.00458) (0.00779) 
    
Quadratic Trend  -0.000970*** -0.000485 
  (0.000136) (0.000371) 
    
Policy* Quadratic 
Trend 
 -7.88e-05 0.000936 
  (0.000162) (0.000794) 
    
Cubic Trend   -9.81e-06 
   (9.75e-06) 
    
Policy*Cubic Trend   -2.76e-05 
   (2.18e-05) 
    
Constant 3.534*** 3.511*** 3.509*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0162) 
    
Observations 923 923 923 
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic Trend No Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend No No Yes 
F Stat (p-value) 12.04 (0.0011) 9.01 (0.0005) 12.04 (0.0000) 
Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
 
 The F tests in these models are also significant. The first F test restricting the 
interaction term between the linear trend and the policy variable to zero returns an F 
statistic of 12.04 and a p-value of less than 0.01. This indicates the interaction term likely 
cannot be legitimately restricted to zero by removing it from the model. The second and 




and possibly cubic trends as well. 
Accounting for the Trends 
Now that the trends have been statistically verified they can be included in the 
regression from the previous chapter to examine the association between RPS and carbon 
emissions while controlling for the trend. The full results are excluded from the table so 
that they fit on the page. 
Table 5 


















Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
 The results in Table 5 show no statistically significant relationship between 
carbon emissions and RPS at the traditional 0.05 level. The models with more than a 
linear trend show a statistically significant increase in CO2 emissions, but below the 
usual levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Policy*Trend Policy*Trend Quadratic Policy*Trend Cubic 
    
RPS 0.0210 0.0254* 0.0224* 
 (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0123) 
    
Constant 3.615*** 3.500*** 3.486*** 
 (0.00882) (0.00870) (0.00569) 
    
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 
R-squared 0.998 0.999 0.999 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic Trend No Yes Yes 




 To examine the mechanisms that an RPS may work through I now include the 
logged total natural gas consumption and logged total electricity consumption with a 
linear trend. The results are in Table 6 below. These tests provide a more nuanced view 
an RPS’s relationship with carbon emissions by controlling for potential channels an RPS 
may affect carbon emissions through. 
Table 6 
































Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
 
                                                             
15 Including residential electricity prices produces similar results.  





NG and Total 
Consumption 
     
RPS 0.0210 0.0113 0.00687 0.00120 
 (0.0157) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0104) 




 0.124***  0.0894*** 




  0.721*** 0.654*** 
   (0.0550) (0.0566) 
     
Constant 3.615*** 2.083*** -6.761*** -6.898*** 
 (0.00882) (0.435) (0.792) (0.803) 
     
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by 
State 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic Trend No No No No 
Cubic Trend No No No No 








The results in Table 6 show no statistically significant relationship between CO2 
and RPS enactment. Natural gas consumption and total energy consumption are both 
positively related to carbon emissions. F tests restricting the inclusion of the controls 
provide statistical evidence in favor of their inclusion in the model.  
Graphical Verification of the Results 
Figure 8 graphically displays the results from the previous regressions. It places 
RPS enactment in event time and shows no coherent relationship between CO2 emissions 
and RPS enactment at time zero. 
 
Figure 8. Event Time Graphical Investigation of the Results: Seven years before and after 
enactment. 
There are many reasons an RPS may not have a statistically detectable 




non-RPS states. A state with an RPS is likely to have a powerful environmental lobby 
that played an instrumental role in providing the political interest group to pass the RPS. 
This lobby is unlikely to care only about enacting the RPS. Instead, it likely pushes for 
many environmental rules and regulations and the RPS is simply one of many measures 
pushing carbon emissions down in the state. The methods I employ may not be able to 
isolate the effect of the RPS. Some previous literature has suggested that there is 










Summary of Results 
The model of CO2 emissions and the enactment of renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS) I develop and estimate is the first to account for state-level heterogeneity by 
entering trend variables. The simple DD model that does not account for the preexisting 
state emissions trends shows that RPS reduces carbon emissions by about five percent, 
but those results may be unreliable. Instead, what is occurring is that the DD model 
overestimates the effect of renewable portfolio standards because RPS states follow a 
path distinct from non-RPS states. That divergence violates the parallel paths assumption 
that DD models rely on. Once the pre-existing trends are accounted for, the DD models 
provide no statistically significant evidence that a renewable portfolio standard has any 
relationship with carbon emissions. Importantly, this study cannot definitively determine 
if RPS achieve the environmental goals they aim to meet, but there are other econometric 
techniques that may be better suited for similar research questions. 
Future Projects 
There are multiple avenues for future work on RPS. Chief among them is the need 
for other statistical investigations with different tools. For example, other statistical 
methods could be employed that may be more appropriate for the data’s limitations and 
nature of the research question. Future researchers could examine cases where random 
assignment or RPS enactment is a more robust assumption, but that approach likely is 
impossible. Regulatory standards do not emerge randomly. Some states, however, may 
better match this assumption than others (states with close elections, for example) and 
thus better approximate the background assumptions of DD estimations. Another method 
might be to match states with similar characteristics and examine the influence of an RPS 




providing a theoretical justification for ignoring certain confounding effects. Synthetic 
control (SC) methods, however, are likely to be the most promising forward step in 
researching the effects of RPS. Synthetics increasingly are common in empirical analyses 
and could be applied to RPS.16 A chief advantage of SC methods is that they account for 
the nonrandom treatment problem that DD methods cannot. 
Theoretical modeling work could also examine the effects of different RPS 
designs. For example, it could model the effects of an environmental performance 
standard in place of a technology standard for RPS. Current standards include potentially 
dirty energy sources while excluding some viable low carbon sources. There are several 
commonly included energy sources on which environmental advocates disagree on. For 
example, Mark Jacobson of the Stanford Solutions Project, the leader of a group of 
academics that modeled how the United States and other countries could run on 100 
percent renewable energy sources, excludes biomass because of concerns about its 
environmental effects. In Pennsylvania, coal ash is included as a qualifying power-
generating resource. Nuclear is commonly identified as a strange energy source to 
exclude from RPS mandates since it produces zero carbon energy. Perhaps even more 
absurd, hydroelectric likewise is also often excluded (Stori 2013; The Hydropower 
Reform Coalition 2014). The political economy of the design of these standards is also an 
important question. 
Another theoretical question for future examination is the effect of trading the 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) that are used to monitor compliance with the RPS 
between states. Each unit of electricity generated from a qualifying energy source creates 
a REC that, in some states, can be traded across state lines (Berry & Jaccard 2001). 
                                                             




Texas, by contrast, requires that all electricity used to meet its goal be generated in the 
state and retired within the state (Center for Energy Economics 2009). 
If the goal of an RPS is to lower emissions and ultimately prevent climate change, 
then it should not matter where the carbon is abated. Climate change is a global problem 
and if the RPS induces consumption of electricity from low carbon sources in place of 
consumption of electricity from high carbon sources, portfolio standards could be seen as 
successful. Some RPS legislation, however, prohibits or limits trading RECs from outside 
of the state. These are, again, likely political economy questions about state-based energy 
groups attempting to capture the rents RPS creates. Yet from a policy perspective, 
restricting REC trading seems unlikely to facilitate lower emissions. This is especially 
true considering that renewable energy resources vary widely by state. These variations 
in energy resource quality simply represent the possibility for gains from trade. 
Apart from the economic and environmental effects of an RPS, researchers could 
also more closely examine the factors contributing to RPS adoption and the enactment of 
certain quirks of RPS design. For example, state policies differ on the amount and type of 
hydroelectric power that counts towards the RPS’s mandate. The restriction of certain 
types of low-carbon energy sources, despite their ability to serve the environmental goals 
of the RPS, present interesting political economy questions about the influence of interest 
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